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
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


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Harold C. Deutsch

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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**VULNERABILITIES AND STRENGTHS OF
DEMOCRATIC AND TOTALITARIAN SYSTEMS
CONFRONTED BY CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE.**

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CONFRONTED BY CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

by

Harold C. Deutsch

26 October 1976

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
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FOREWORD

Most studies dealing with civilian-based defense concentrate attention on analysis of the means to be employed and give little thought to the vulnerabilities and strengths of potential target countries. The categories into which these would most naturally fall are societies which are relatively open or democratic, and those that are strongly authoritarian or actually totalitarian. The author believes that, although civilian-based defense is likely to be less fierce against a democratic foe, it has better prospects of being effective. He comments that an authoritarian state, experienced in regimenting its own people and with far fewer scruples about Draconian measures, can often crush resistance against which the qualms and decent hesitation of a democracy may find it difficult to make headway. Considering the differences between the two forms of government, the memorandum concludes that a strong posture of civilian-based defense may deter a democratic opponent but represent a come-on to a totalitarian one.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. HAROLD C. DEUTSCH, currently assigned to the Directorate of Academic Affairs, joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1974. During the two years previously he was Director of European Studies at the National War College. Dr. Deutsch was on the faculty of the University of Minnesota as professor of history, and served as department chairman from 1960-66. During World War II, he was chief of the Political Subdivision for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and then headed the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS Mission in Germany. His main area of interest lies in the history of World War II and the period since, and his publications are largely in this field, though also dealing with the Napoleonic period. His most recent book (1974) deals with *Hitler and His Generals: The Hidden Crisis of January-June 1938*.

**VULNERABILITIES AND STRENGTHS OF
DEMOCRATIC AND TOTALITARIAN SYSTEMS
CONFRONTED BY CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE**

Estimates of the utility of military force in international crises have declined steadily during the course of the present generation. The most determining role in this phenomenon has been the advent of nuclear weapons; however, there is much about the nature and range of their impact that remains to be explored and more fully appreciated. Terms such as "balance of terror" and "nuclear stalemate" have long been familiar in evaluating consequences in the relations of the superpowers. The significance of the nuclear position of the two middle-range states, France and Britain, is less clear. China's nuclear status requires constant reassessment, particularly of the scope and worth of its delivery systems. Assuming continued and conceivably wholesale proliferation during the next two decades, a staggering number of additional problems loom before us. If permitted to remain unchecked, such proliferation appears certain to affect every relationship between states in all parts of the globe, with a coincident reduction of means to isolate crisis and conflicts.

Closely related, but proceeding parallel to this dominating aspect of the world scene, are other factors which make less effective the threat of employment of military force, especially by great powers against weaker states. At every level of international affairs, new and only half

discerned features further complicate the picture. As a part of this, other traditional means of pressure are changing in character and potency. Altogether, there is a growing demand for a thorough review of the traditional means of international suasion and for consideration and possible cultivation of newer concepts that could contribute to this end.

Among the latter, the notion of fashioning more sophisticated and presumably more effective techniques of nonviolent resistance is gaining adherents. Such resistance is conceived by some as an actual alternative to military defense, by others as a substitute after military measures have been tried and have failed. The agency to launch and manage such a program could be a continuing legitimate government, a government-in-exile, or a clandestinely organized and operating directorate. Expectations also extend to more or less spontaneous participation in unarmed resistance by the population as a whole with little if any visible guidance or leadership.

In brief, there is an increasing effort to elaborate and systematize the concept of a civilian-based defense (CBD), which is lauded as contrasting sharply with anything like a *supine yielding to force*. CBD adherents advocate resisting an invader vigorously, using all disruptive means (material, economic, and psychological) but without using weapons. To lay stress on this positive aspect, words like "tough" and "pragmatic" are common to the vocabulary of CBD advocates in describing the difference, real or supposed, between their own approach and a purely pacifist option for nonviolence. Though the moral superiority of such a line of action to the use of military force is often assumed, this position is usually assigned a secondary role and indeed is not regarded particularly relevant. At least this aspect is not classed essential to the argument. Instead, CBD's principal justification is the claim that it promises to be as much or more effectual in ultimate impact as military force itself. Emphasis is naturally laid on the generally admitted fact that in the current and, even more, in prospective world situations, the exercise of the more familiar forms of power involves all the known and ever newer forms of hazard for mankind, notably for these countries which are usually classed as bystanders.

Situations in which CBD is thought most suitable are such as involve domestic crises resulting from the subversion or threatened subversion of a constitutional order; and prospective or actual invasion and occupation by a foreign power. The means available to deter or

confront the initiators of such an action are spelled out at great length and their effectiveness estimated by CBD analysts. The anticipated impact in terms of the types of target states, however, is usually passed over. The most logical categories into which these may be assumed to fall are relatively open societies subscribing to constitutional and democratic principles; and highly authoritarian or actually totalitarian systems with only limited commitment to traditional codes of international conduct or, for that matter, of political conduct generally. This essay proposes to deal with the prospective efficacy of CBD when employed by a democratic state against targets of similar or of totalitarian type.

THE ROLE OF AIMS AND INTENTIONS

The predicament of a society threatened with attack or one that is actively defending itself depends in great measure on the goals and standards of conduct of its potential opponents. There are almost certain to be fundamental differences between the aims and modus operandi of the leaders of democratic and totalitarian societies. Though at times during imposition of military government there may be little to choose between the severity of their measures, in general the latter are prone to exhibit, in the international arena, the arbitrary policies and tactics to which they are addicted in their own territories. In particular, totalitarian rulers are seldom greatly influenced by traditional concepts of morality or humanity.

To consider immediately the most drastic fashion in which this may manifest itself, one need think only of the revival in our century of the form of barbarism known as genocide. Inclinations toward policies which have some of this character can, of course, arise in any social order. But in a democratic-constitutional state it would appear inconceivable that ruling figures, unless suffering from mental derangement, should contemplate such a course in cold blood, least of all as a rationale for launching military operations against other countries. Such impulses are essentially limited to moments of extreme stress and warped judgment, usually toward the end of wars fought with exceptional bitterness. On such occasions vindictive emotions may burst the bonds of traditional humanity, but, being the result of hysteria rather than calculation, are likely to have a short life. An example of this is the Morgenthau Plan, which in a limited but scarcely mistakable way had a genocidal tinge. For a while, in the autumn of

1944, it threatened to emerge as American policy but was never taken entirely seriously by the top Western leaders and quickly faded into oblivion.

Hitler's example furnishes all the proof needed that a totalitarian leader of twisted mind may not only harbor such intentions but can go a long way toward implementing them. Stalin and Mussolini did not entertain any racist dogma as the central coordinating principle of their policies, yet both showed themselves quite prepared to adopt similar methods when it suited them. In recent years the problem has been introduced into some of the tribal conflicts of Africa, and many Israelis believe that they lie under a similar threat in the Middle East.

Against invading foes of genocidal type, CBD is likely to be useless or even self-defeating. None of the expedients yet devised or likely to be in the future has much prospect of making headway against an opponent who is either deliberately embarked on a policy of genocide or is prepared to embrace it as a serious option when it suits his purpose. In such cases, in fact, CBD may merely equip him with a handy excuse for proceeding with greater ruthlessness and dispatch in promoting his sinister ends.

The situation is somewhat less desperate for CBD when the target group for genocide is an unpopular minority in the defending country. If, like the Jews in Poland and some areas of the USSR during World War II, this group is already a mark for native prejudice, CBD may proceed on the part of those who are not themselves affected.

There are, of course, a multitude of other ways short of readiness to liquidate masses of people in which the motives and intentions of would-be attackers must influence heavily the response of prospective defenders. If the latter rely heavily on CBD to deter or meet aggression, many forms of force less extreme than genocide can be mobilized to deal with it. Whether the party engaged in occupation looks upon his incursion as a transitory experience or has come to stay plays a role in many ways. If occupation is for him the prelude to annexation or some sort of satellite relationship, he will conduct himself quite differently than if he is waiting for the end of the war or of a postwar occupation period.

Except when moved by irredentism, which is to be dealt with more fully below, a democratic foe will at the very least be uneasy about his own annexationist impulses. Both 20th century precedents and democratic ideological tendencies help determine his attitude. Woodrow Wilson set a continuing democratic style in his ardent

espousal of self-determination. Second thoughts about extending one's rule abroad also derive from the often traumatic experience of the West in decolonization. Insofar as there may be a democratic missionary urge in Europe or America, this also has been curbed as a result of two postwar fiascos in spreading democracy. It is now widely appreciated that democracy is far more difficult to impose than totalitarianism. At best one hopes to create conditions under which democracy can make headway. And the methods to make it palatable are likely to be on the gentle side. CBD can thus count on making headway if it does not go so far as to oblige this type of occupier to take overly strong countermeasures.

It follows that the stakes in an occupation situation where the intruder is of democratic-constitutional type most probably will not have a life or death character. A totalitarian foe must be put in an altogether different category. A totalitarian system by its nature is grounded on an ideology. That of Nazi-Facism is unqualifiedly exploitive while Marxism-Leninism lays claim to the whole of mankind. Either lends itself easily to indiscriminate expansionism. In addition, this is accentuated by the position of the totalitarian leader, who must depend heavily on the prestige factor in all foreign contacts. Since the days of the ancient Greek tyrants, conquest has been a stock in trade of dictatorial regimes. Caesarism and Bonapartism are but two of the many precursors of the wholesale expansionists of our century. It was only convenience and opportunity which determined whether Hitler should move first against Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, or the Western Powers; Mussolini should throw himself as a starter on France, Greece, Yugoslavia or Ethiopia; or Stalin should initially direct a surge westward against the Baltic, the Balkans, or Turkey.

The threat to a people of being permanently subjected is perhaps greatest when, as in the case of communism, the national expansionist drive is accentuated by a missionary ideology which dedicates itself to the proposition that all parts of the world are fated to pass under its aegis. In such cases, it is almost inconceivable that an invader, given no compelling circumstances, should ever depart. For CBD this means a much tougher mission than when he looks upon his stay as transitory.

Irredentism—the urge to recover lost territories or to seize whatever is claimed to be part of the national heritage—of course plays a part in most expansive drives. In the case of the Western democracies, it has been prone to be the most basic and, at times, the exclusive motivation. In that of the three dictators mentioned, it served mainly as a

propaganda ploy to whip up support at home or disarm criticism and allay anxiety abroad.

A government planning or carrying on CBD thus faces very different problems depending on whether the target state against which it is to be mobilized belongs to the one family or the other. A democratic state, seeking the most complete possible amalgamation with any area to be annexed, inclines to conciliatory courses at least in its dealings with the desired territorial segment. It may also try to preclude counterirredentism and revanchism on the part of the mutilated parent body by promoting the partitioning of the latter.¹

A final point in the area of comparative aims deals with the extent to which occupation may develop into an aim in itself. The key question concerns the degree to which occupation has been or may become profitable or costly. Because of self-imposed restraints of a democratic occupation authority and the usual economic dislocations of international conflict, the experience is frequently an onerous one, to be escaped as soon as possible. Notably the advantage of being an ex-enemy of the United States has been lauded in familiar jokes. CBD, if kept within some bounds, can perhaps help along with the urge to early evacuation.

No such squeamishness about the lot of the defeated troubles the masters of totalitarian systems. Even if, for their own reasons, they abandon or postpone plans for annexations, they will often attempt to prolong occupation situations and to make them pay. The extent to which CBD can interfere with this objective to reduce the invader's inclination to stay on as long as possible is, to say the least, problematical.

BASIC STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES IN COMBATING CBD

The central conclusion of this study—that totalitarian systems are fundamentally more potent in facing CBD than their democratic rivals—may already be anticipated. However, it must be stressed that any such superiority is not exclusively one-sided. Both political orders have their better armed and more exposed sides in such a contest and their relative showings may well be determined by the circumstances of their individual encounters.

The basic advantage of a totalitarian state grappling with CBD lies in its prolonged experience in regimenting its own people. Its leaders have

become proficient in enforcing political, social, and economic disciplines. When their purview is expanded to an occupation situation, they tend to keep on doing what comes naturally. Their reputation having gone before them, a population may already be terrified and half intimidated before their work has really begun. Confronted with so stern an invader, CBD also may prove half-hearted in design and execution.

Thus totalitarian occupation authorities have readily in-hand many tools that the agents of democracy must build from scratch and may, especially at first, shrink from using. In addition to the controls familiar to them, totalitarians are prone to employ extreme means beyond those with which they are already familiar at home. Such drastic expedients as general or selective genocide, the wholesale transfer or exchange of populations, forced labor, clearing or laying waste broad territories, or bringing in large numbers of their own or other outside people are all entirely conceivable. For historic examples one need not go back farther than Hitler or Stalin, who between them practiced every one of these measures and would not have scrupled to go further if occasion, in their view, had demanded.

A totalitarian state may therefore be expected to enter upon an occupation situation with an overwhelming array of repressive gadgetry. In such cases as that of the Soviets, there is also the experience of half a century of dominance over national groups alien in political tradition and culture to the Russian people. When, as in this instance, the totalitarian intruders are also Communists, they carry with them a stock of appeals that help to split the resisters: the promise of help for the underdog; a positive vision, as they conceive it, on the perfectibility of man; and a well-defined political religion. Their Nazi-Facist rivals dispose over far fewer attractions and carry with them everywhere the stigma of disdain for most of their fellowmen.

The easy adaptability of the totalitarian police state apparatus to dominate an occupied area can serve in many ways to crush efforts of CBD and to divide its supporters. But in some respects the problem for the invader may also be tougher. Normally the dread of coming under totalitarian rule will be greater than any fear of subjection to a democratic order and will often excite stouter resistance. Previous to being attacked, it may fortify the decision of the prospective defender to develop a strong CBD organization and to give it support once a conflict is joined.

As already noted, the aims of a totalitarian power are apt to be

construed as more ambitious and thus to be more bitterly opposed. The totalitarian disposition to rule by compulsion and terror, whether or not as a last resort, can as much rouse furious resistance as intimidate. Instead of a shortcut to enforcing submission, it may stiffen the resolution to fight harder.

Totalitarian administrators, who are often arbitrary and inclined to be unyielding in their ways, are usually inept in gauging the sentiments of a people, the more so when the country is strange to them in tradition and culture. The dictatorial leader himself is usually contemptuous of democratic principles and believes that those who profess them are self-indulgent and soft. In some ways and at certain times such contempt may have been deserved. But the lack of empathy on the part of totalitarian leaders for peoples of different stamp deprives them of the power to recognize the inner resources of freer men at such moments of desperate crisis as Britain faced in the summer of 1940. In brief, the overestimate of the utility of force at times leads to its employment in a fashion that defeats the purposes for which it is exercised. CBD can always count on the mistakes of such an adversary. It is, of course, another matter whether its own resources are adequate to the task that remains before it.

The prestige factor, demanding a constant show of success, is a major influence in the leadership problems of every social order and tends most to be in the foreground in foreign relations. It need not be stressed that the closer any government comes to one-man rule, the more this factor will play a critical role and the more it leads to rigid persistence in chosen courses. The dilemma is worst in Nazi-Fascism, where leadership stakes its legitimacy entirely on the claim to unvarying effectiveness. Totalitarian rulers, especially again those of Fascist type, tend beyond this to pride themselves on a posture of toughness and inflexibility. CBD, though it avoids the test of force, seeks to appear as defiance incarnate by manifesting itself in every fiber of the social web. Therefore it represents a major challenge to the leader's prestige and self-esteem, which makes him wish to strike out more indiscriminately as resistance stiffens. Whether the result is to crush CBD or, oppositely, to create a less tenable position for the invader will then depend on circumstances.

Democratic leaders generally expose themselves less to such situations. They are accustomed to a high degree of dissidence, develop a certain tolerance for it, and are less sensitive to opposition and occasional setbacks. They are less upset about minor acts of defiance

and are psychologically attuned to making concessions when these seem the wiser course. This gives them more balanced judgment in times of stress. In turn, many of them lack the determination and ruthlessness which are also needed under certain conditions. If their political training has been sound, it has given them inhibitions in the use of power. This makes them especially vulnerable to passive resistance. Such nonviolent defiance as boycotts and public demonstrations tend to give them a feeling of helplessness. The British often showed this in India and the Americans have done so on innumerable occasions during civil rights and other domestic controversies.

It is true that, in wartime, democratic governments take on some of the trappings and powers of dictatorship and proceed accordingly in affairs at home and abroad. As there is no previous experience, nine-tenths of this has to be made-to-order. There is small probability of elaborately worked-out programs for dealing with CBD. How, indeed, would this be possible in a genuine democracy without planning a military initiative and submitting to a stultifying measure of public debate? The people's "right to know" would quickly end all secrecy about plans and preparation of this character.

If war comes and eventuates in the occupation of foreign territory, a democracy will then almost certainly have to improvise. It will usually be reluctant and tardy in applying severe measures, a tardiness which allows a critical situation to ripen till it is harder to handle. Doubts and hesitations carry over even into moments of passionate punitive impulse. Those who recall their ancient history will be reminded of the second thoughts of the Athenian assembly after issuing orders for the execution of the rebels on certain islands.

It is not necessary to adduce the example of the Vietnam War to appreciate that democracies rarely are entirely convinced of the full justice of their cause when its pursuit involves this degree of violence. A related vulnerability is a sensitiveness to critical world opinion that greatly exceeds that of the heads of authoritarian systems.

CBD AND THE COURT OF WORLD OPINION

The potential power of CBD as an instrument in international crisis can be much enhanced by success in calling on the aid of world opinion. No country or national leader can afford to ignore this completely in the conduct of foreign affairs. Yet there is a vast range of degree and type of attention that they may be inclined to give to it.

Societies and individual leaders will differ greatly in allowing world opinion to influence their policies and modes of operation.

Democratic regimes and their heads are accustomed to derive their power and influence from popular support. It is in their nature to give more weight to freely given approval, whether internal or external, than is the inclination of those who control more authoritarian systems. Moderation, compassion, and general humanity are admired qualities in most democratic societies, whereas totalitarians frequently boast their hardness and inflexibility. Both the American and French Revolutions made much of their "decent respect for the opinions of mankind" and this principle has remained a firm part of the democratic tradition. Altogether, democratic leaders are inclined to be sensitive to impressions to be expected from their acts in each of the fora with which they are concerned: the homeland, the occupied territory, allied nations, and the world of the hostile or uncommitted. The media and communications can be regimented only in occupied territory and, in some degree, at home. So there is bound to be spillover of criticism from one area to another. Every caution exercised to avoid unfavorable reactions opens the gates more to CBD. For its directors this can be an asset of considerable and, at critical times, of immense value.

There is a vast contrast between this relatively advantageous situation for CBD and that which it faces in dealing with the less sensitive totalitarians. One is reminded of a cartoon in *Punch* some years ago. A bedraggled and woebegone American ambassador is standing before the shambles of his embassy. One man from a triumphant mob that is drawing off lingers to exchange some words with him. "Why," asks the ambassador, "do you do this only to us when the Soviets are known by you to be just as involved in what you are protesting?" "But, Sir," is the astonished reply, "everybody knows that the Soviets care nothing about world opinion."

Totalitarians, in other words, have a reputation for thick hides in such matters. This does not always extend to the leadership, which, increasingly egomaniac and often hypersensitive to the slightest censure, at times watch foreign media even more closely than their democratic opposite numbers. Their reaction, however, is rarely one of retreat or compliance. As noted in discussion of the prestige factor, it is more likely to be one of baffled fury (as they cannot get at the critics) and persistence in their course. CBD operators cannot expect much help from world opinion when confronted with opponents of this type.

Aside from their limited concern for "what the world thinks,"

totalitarian leaders can indulge in and get away with harsher policies because of their iron control over the media and communications in their own country, any occupied area, and in satellite states. Though they will on occasion highly publicize acts of severity for the sake of intimidation, they suppress such information or give it a coloring convenient to them. It has often been claimed that Gandhi could never have brought his cause before the bar of world opinion if it had not been the British with whom he had to deal. In a totalitarian society, he would merely have disappeared into a concentration camp or the crematory and the world might have heard little or nothing of him.

WHAT IF CBD IS SUPERSEDED BY VIOLENCE?

Both states which contemplate the use of CBD, and the ones who conceivably might move against them, must include in their reckonings that the intended "war without weapons" may progress inexorably toward violence. For a constitutional government that may consider engaging in a military action against another country, such a possibility must cause considerable concern. As a rule, the value it sets upon human life will much exceed that of any dictatorial regime. This makes it correspondingly more sensible of injuries inflicted on its agents as the result of terrorism or guerrilla warfare. A democratic occupying power will also be apprehensive, or at least uneasy, about the measures, escalating in severity, which it may be compelled to take. Especially when escalation is long drawn out, such a situation threatens to become a vicious circle, inciting ever greater resistance and compromising the invader's case both among his own people and before world opinion. The danger of losing home support then becomes increasingly real.

The bill that must be anticipated by a totalitarian if violence takes over will appear to him a far more reasonable one. He will probably be more nonchalant about injury to his own military and other agents and disposed from the start to sharp reprisals. He may, in fact, welcome the opportunity to strike back hard. Judiciously publicized acts of violence enable him to kill two birds with one stone: savagely put down the appeal to force and exploit it as an excuse to proceed more harshly against CBD also. With this latter aim in mind, he may even provoke or stage acts of violence for which the blame is then shoved onto the local population.

A totalitarian state may further count, though success will depend much on its tactics, on dealing more effectively than a democratic

occupying authority with conditions in which CBD has degenerated into violence. Having more or less experience with ruling by terror, it will hesitate less in fighting fire with fire. In accordance with this probability, those who plan and place their faith in CBD must face the fact that the rigorous policies of a totalitarian invader are so apt to provoke violence that their own program of nonviolence may soon collapse. When terror is made trump, those more accustomed to its practice will hold the higher cards.

For the resisters there is also the danger that the occupying authority, by inciting violence, will disrupt their ranks. Advocates of CBD try to persuade their fellow citizens that it is an effectual substitute for force, at least once the nation is suffering occupation. Therefore, when violence nevertheless intrudes upon the scene, notably when it appears rather aimless and introduced by the more restless defenders for its own sake, it threatens to wreck both any CBD program and the common front of the resisters. By generating severe retaliation, violence raises deep resentments against its perpetrators and their backers. The European resistance movements of World War II furnish innumerable examples of such splits among the resisters as well as between them and the nation at large. Democratic occupation authorities may not be immune to such cynical courses. But it goes without saying that it is a game in which totalitarians are far more likely to feel at home.

OSTENTATIOUS CBD PREPARATIONS AS A FORM OF DETERRENCE

CBD clearly provides no pattern of defense which can easily be improvised and suddenly sprung on potential adversaries in times of crisis or conflict. To have any chance of success, the nation for which it is proposed must be fully convinced of its high purpose as well as of its efficacy. The potential success of CBD also depends on fashioning an elaborate program of indoctrination and training. All these potential requirements patently require closest study, intensive publicity, and prolonged public debate. To prepare even the most receptive nation properly would, for a crash program, take many months and, for one done under less pressure, years.

So much talk, preparation, and rehearsal would obviously put all one's neighbors on notice. CBD advocates laud this as an advantage, basing this view on the argument that it would reassure the innocent of

mind and give pause to the ill-intentioned. To heighten the impact, it is indeed suggested to stage periodic maneuvers to which foreign observers might be invited. Each stage of the national conversion and training is reckoned to have its own particular value for deterring attack, especially in the case of a potential democratic opponent. Because CBD betokens a renunciation of all aggressive aims, one's neighbors would be liberated from that fear which so often in history has by itself led to bellicose behavior. So impressive a demonstration of pacific intent is also estimated to make it more difficult for bellicose leaders of constitutional states, should there be any such, to stir up war sentiment in their countries. The more optimistic proponents of CBD, in fact, hope that embracing it in one land will work infectiously on its neighbors, creating a popular demand for a similar posture. It is an assumption that does not appear entirely illusory among societies that subscribe to similar codes of human and international behavior.²

Any such hopeful forecast must be amended drastically when referring to occupation by states under totalitarian rule. Heretofore these have uncompromisingly rejected any concept of a stabilized world order and have insisted that they are the riders of one or another wave of the future. Knowing what the converts to CBD have in mind and are preparing to do, the reactions of totalitarian leaders are all too apt to take one of the following lines:

- If CBD is taken entirely seriously as an efficacious instrument for defense and if world conditions are otherwise propitious, a would-be attacker might well be inclined to take preclusive action, launching an assault before it has reached too advanced a stage.

- On the assumption that, the greater the commitment of a potential defender to CBD, the more likely his neglect of military preparedness, an aggressor might decide to let the situation ripen while awaiting a convenient moment for attack.

- A potential attacker might wait until the full pattern of CBD has revealed itself, meanwhile training his own soldiers and administrators in the strategy and tactics that would promise the most effective response. As the more determined, rigorous, and disciplined in execution, he might well count on constituting a more sophisticated and effectual counterforce than the organization in preparation to conduct CBD.

- In situations where the state dedicated to the use of CBD appears vulnerable to subversion—where, for example, there are discontented national minorities or many ideological dissenters—the full disclosure of

plans and preparations could produce great hazards. As they progressed, the provisions for CBD would reveal starkly the strong points in the political and social fabric of the nation that could be undermined and the weaker ones to be exploited. A hostile state could discover here the ideal opening for a campaign of subversion that was aimed both to negate the achievement of effective CBD and to gnaw away at the fabric of society in general.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: CBD AS DETERRENCE

In a world where large scale employment of military force involves risks that are increasingly prohibitive, all forms of defense perforce must be judged for their value in deterrence. CBD, therefore, must also be appraised in terms of its influence in discouraging hostile acts of other states. The present analysis has concentrated exclusively on the special problems of a democratic defender in planning and directing CBD against totalitarian or against other democratic states. The results are so different that CBD proponents should probably think of two types of models by which they might strike at the strengths and exploit the weaknesses of each form of society. Obviously there is a separate set of problems for a closed society facing invasion by a democratic power or by a member of its own or another type of totalitarian regime.

What probably emerges most clearly from our analysis is the way in which the challenges of CBD reveal how the two selected groups of states show both vulnerabilities and potencies in dealing with each aspect of them. On the assessment on which of them is judged potentially most effectual in dealing with CBD, there has probably never been a doubt during the reading of this paper. CBD's faculty of deterrence appears immensely greater when the target is a democratic state. Its mere proclamation must have a disarming effect, resulting in psychological pressure on neighbors of similar stamp to adopt such programs and putting a stigma on military initiative.

In an actual CBD situation, democratic occupation authorities are likely to enter upon their assignments with little preparation, must perforce improvise at every step, and are likely to be hesitant about stringent measures. Unless subjectively driven by passionate irredentism, democratic leaders would be prone to take a jaundiced view of the entire prospect of an occupation. A strong setup for CBD on their opponent's part would be an additional inhibitive factor in an

international crisis. With respect to intentions, a democratic regime would be less influenced by annexationist aspirations during a crisis and less inclined to set up house politically once an occupation were in being.

In contrast, it is highly problematical that the expectation of encountering a strong CBD commitment would exercise any deterrent effect whatever on a totalitarian state caught up in one of its expansive phases. In the case of such irresponsible adventurers as Hitler and Mussolini, CBD might appear a veritable treasure trove of temptations to aggression. The deterrent credibility of the prospective defender's military force would be discounted by them, and most other totalitarians, in exact proportion to his growing dedication to CBD. One is reminded of Stalin's cynical query on how many divisions could be fielded by an historic practitioner of CBD, the Pope.

In view of the absolute mastery of media and communications by totalitarians, any danger of contagion in the sense of CBD becoming attractive to their own people may be minimized. As for any anticipatory apprehension of the problems that must be expected from CBD after occupation takes place, it appears most improbable that a totalitarian leader would greatly trouble himself about them. He is conditioned to low estimates of the national will of supposedly moribund democratic societies, is a worshipper at the shrine of pure force, and, as often as not, may welcome showy resistance that will allow him to tighten the screws and strike as much at latent as at open opposition. The main historic examples of something resembling CBD—some manifestations of the western and northern European resistance movements during World War II—will hardly impress him. Until the time of the invasion of Normandy, most of them did not manage much beyond pinpricks. To a tough totalitarian, the practitioners of CBD may well look much like sheep in wolves' clothing.

There is one type of case where a resolute posture of CBD can indeed exercise extraordinary influence on the most determined ill-wisher, totalitarian or otherwise. This situation prevails when the defiant state controls resources vital to the would-be aggressor and sufficiently vulnerable to being eliminated from use for a considerable period by a single dramatic action. When so confronted, the most wreckless adventurer must think twice. The best historic examples go back to World War II, when Hitler on several occasions weighed decisions about invading Switzerland and Sweden, both of which had

sensitive capabilities that he coveted. The Swiss openly threatened the wrecking of the passage over the St. Gotthard Pass, the main German supply line into Italy. Though perhaps less challengingly, the Swedes clearly would have done as much for their orefields of Gallivare and the associated port of Lulea. As for the future, one can, without too much stretch of imagination, picture what the threat of exploding a nuclear bomb to block the Dardanelles would do to any Soviet thought about moving against Turkey.

Some of the deficiencies of a totalitarian occupier in dealing with a CBD situation have been enumerated. Though they may play some role in the calculations of CBD operators, it is most questionable whether they would do so in advance estimates of the attacking party. This would require a degree of introspection and self-analysis that asks too much of human nature. Least of all, to give a single illustration, could one expect a dictatorial leader to recognize and admit his incapacity to gauge adequately the qualities of unfamiliar nations and societies?

In the case of a superpower that can boast a full array of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them anywhere, CBD can hardly add in any way to its capacity to deter or resist attack. Both Nikita Khrushchev and his successors have advanced as sole justification of their "peaceful co-existence" policy, i.e., eliminating as a serious option the idea of making full-scale war on the United States, the existence of a nuclear stalemate. Any American move toward adopting CBD as some kind of alternative would weaken or demolish this barrier to Soviet predatory behavior.

The key question on CBD—the one that will most frequently be asked by both democratic and totalitarian neighbors—will always be whether it is adopted as the primary or auxiliary system of defense. If it is understood by all to be a second, rather than sole, line of defense, it can add much to a generally more determined and formidable national posture. Even as a primary defensive system it may still have a strong deterrent effect for democratic neighbors. In the case of others, there will always be the danger that any rejection of forceful response in advance will seem to them an invitation to aggression.

ENDNOTES

1. As in the case of the French after World War II. British and American inclinations toward the end of World War II to partition Germany belong in a somewhat different category.

2. This comment would have been difficult to make earlier in our century. Whatever realism it can now claim derives from the chastening experience of two world wars and the ever darkening shadow of nuclear proliferation.

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states have more inhibitions. So, though CBD may be less fierce against them, it is far more likely to be effective. Totalitarians are also more practiced in regimentation. They are likely to interpret ostentatious preparations for CBD as signs of weakness and a virtual come-on.

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